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Case No. 9115 
IN THE SUPREME COURT 
of the O 
STATE OF UfH\ L ~.·· 
0 (.'.-~ 1 (I t ',t;J ., 
VADA J. TOMLINSON ACOTT, REBA 
TOMLINSON FULLER, RUBY TOMLIN,.___ _ ~-~~~;~:-:.:. c~.:.i,-~;;;h··-·-
SON BEEBE, NORA E. ~OMLINSON 
SCHOCKLEY, MARGUERITE TOMLIN-
SON ·CISNEY, and ALTON E. TOMLIN-
SON, 
Plaintiffs and Respondents, 
-vs.-
UNION CARBIDE NUCLEAR COM-
PANY, 
Defendant and Third-Party Plaintiff 
-vs.-
LESLIE A. TOMLINSON, Individually 
and as Administrator of the Estate of A. 
L. Tomlinson, Deceased, 
Third-Party Defenoont and Appellant. 
BRIEF OF THIRD-PARTY DEFENDANT AND 
APPELLANT 
Appeal from the District Court of the Seventh Judicial District, 
in and for the County of Carbon, State of Utah 
HONORABLE F. W. KELLER, Judge 
FRED H. EVANS 
Attorney for Third-Party Defendant 
and Appellant 
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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
of the 
STATE OF UTAH 
V ADA J. TOMLINSON ACOTT, REBA 
TOMLINSON FULLER, RUBY TOMLIN-
SON BEEBE, NORA E. TOMLINSON 
SCHOCKLEY, MARGUERITE TOMLIN-
SON ·CISNEY, and ALTON E. TOMLIN-
SON, 
Plaintiffs and Respondents, 
-vs.-
UNION CARBIDE NUCLEAR COM-
PANY, 
Defendant and Third-Party Plaintiff 
-vs.-
LESLIE A. TOMLINSON, Individually 
and as Administrator of the Estate of A. 
L. Tomlinson, Deceased, 
Third-Party Defendant and Appellant. 
Case No. 9115 
BRIEF OF THIRD-PARTY DEFENDANT AND 
APPELLANT 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The appeal herein arises out of a prior action entitled 
Acott, et al., vs. Tomlinson, 9 Utah 2d 71, 337 P.2d 720, 
which case will hereinafter be referred to as the prior 
case. The plaintiffs and respondents herein are indenti-
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2 
cal to the plaintiffs in the prior case, and the third-party 
defendant and appellant herein was the defendant in the 
prior case. The parties referred to constitute all of the 
heirs of A.L. Tomlinson, deceased, except the widow 
who was not a party to the prior case and is not a party 
to this action. For convenience, plaintiffs and respond-
ents will hereafter be referred to as Respondents and 
third-party defendant will hereafter be referred to as 
A.ppellant. 
The fundamental matter involved in this case is the 
interest of the Appellant in certain mining claims situate 
in Emery County, which were the subject matter of the 
prior case. This interest will be referred to herein as the 
Tomlinson interest. The judgment in the prior case im-
posed a constructive trust in favor of the Respondents 
as to 12/21st of the Tomlinson interest. It also awarded 
Respondents a substantial money judgment by reason 
of an accounting relating to the trust property. The pro-
ceedings following the judgment in the prior case, which 
was entered on February 20, 1958, gave rise to the instant 
case. 
On the 1st day of April, 1958, the Respondents caused 
an execution to issue out of the District Court of Carbon 
County to subject the Appellant's rights in the Tomlin-
son interest to the judgment of February 20, 1958, (R. 2). 
The Appellant moved the court to stay the sale and exe-
cution, but sofar as the record shows, the motion was 
ignored. On May 8, 1958, the sheriff of Emery County 
1nade and filed his return on execution, which represented 
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that the Appellant's interest had been sold to Respond-
ents for the sum of $3,000.00, all of which, with the ex-
ception of $40.03, was applied to the judgment. The 
Hheriff's deed, which was executed pursuant to the sale, 
recited that the Respondents were the owners of the en-
tire Tomlinson interest. This is the representation in 
paragraph (c) of Respondents' motion for summary 
judgment, (R. 33). On April 21, 1958, the Appellant 
filed his notice of appeal in the prior case, (Appeal No. 
8879). In that appeal, the Respondents filed a cross-
appeal claiming that the parties and the widow, Lillie M. 
Tomlinson, had agreed to divide the estate of A. L. Tom-
linson equally, each heir being entitled to a 1/8th interest. 
The decision of this Court in the appeal was filed on 
April 6, 1959. It affirmed the judgment of the trial court 
as far as the constructive trust was concerned, but de-
nied Respondents' claim relating to the division of inter-
est. The language of the court is as follows: 
"Notwithstanding plaintiffs' evidence that 
the heirs, including the mother, when they shared 
in the proceeds did so in equal shares, the evidence 
is not so clear and persuasive as to make manda-
tory a finding that such was the agreement be-
tween them. Furthermore, the mother is not a 
party to this suit. The effect of the plaintiffs' 
contention is that the court should adjudicate her 
rights, depriving her of her full widow's statutory 
share in the property, in a suit to which she is not 
a party, which the trial court properly refused 
to do." Acott, et al., v. Tomlinson, supra. 
During the process of the litigation of the prior case, 
certain royalties had accumulated in the hands of certain 
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trustees and Union Carbide Nuclear Company, defend-
ant and third-party plaintiff herein. As a result of the 
attempts to force the payment of the funds, the Respond-
ents filed their complaint in this action on April1, 1958, 
the date on which the writ of execution herein issued. 
Upon the motion of Union Carbide Nuclear Company, 
the Appellant was joined. Appellant filed his answer to 
the third-party complaint and set forth a counterclaim, 
and the Respondents thereafter filed their reply to the 
counterclaim. On the 18th day of August, 1958, the 
Respondents filed a motion for summary judgment, 
(R. 36). The Respondents' motion came on for hearing 
on the 19th day of August, 1958, at which time the court 
denied the motion without prejudice to Respondents' 
right to renew, (R. 62). The motion was renewed, and 
was again heard on October 7, 1958, at which time the 
court granted the motion and entered a judgment. (R. 
43, 62). The Appellant thereafter filed his motion to 
vacate judgment on the 23rd day of June, 1959, and the 
court signed an amended judgment on the 7th of July, 
1959, (R. 49). 
The foregoing presents the events leading up to this 
appeal with reference to the pleadings involved, and par-
ticularly the motion for summary judgment, the grant-
ing of which is the subject matter of this appeal. 
STATEMENT OF POIKTS 
THE COURT ERRED IN GRANTING RESPONDENTS' 
MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT. 
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ARGUMENT 
THE COURT ERRED IN GRANTING RESPONDENTS' 
MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT. 
The Appellant believes that the proper purpose and 
function of a motion for summary judgment is to sepa-
rate the formal from the substantial issues, eliminate im-
proper issues, determine the issues of fact which must be 
presented to the court or jury and enable the court to give 
judgment on the issues of law where no disputed issues of 
fact are found. In arriving at the appropriate answer, 
this Court has followed the rule that the party against 
whom the judgment has been granted is entitled to have 
all of the facts presented and the inferences arising there-
from considered in the light most favorable to him, Young 
'V. The Texas Company, 8 Utah 2d 206, 331 P.2d 1099. 
Accordingly, the party asking the court to grant a motion 
for summary judgment has the burden of demonstrating 
clearly that there is no genuine issue of fact. 3 Federal 
Practice and Procedure, section 1235. Where the motion 
attempts to adjudicate the entire controversy, it should 
be directed toward all of the pleadings. 
It is difficult to determine whether Respondents' 
motion was directed only to issues between them and de-
fendant and third-party plaintiff, or was to include Ap-
pellant's answer and counterclaim. The appellant's an-
swer and counterclaim raised issues of fact relating to 
the sale on execution and the adequacy of the price 
paid by the Respondents, who were the sole bidders and 
purchasers. The record does not disclose that any men-
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tion was made of the presence or absence of these issues. 
Inspite of the fact that Respondents admitted there were 
issues of fact, (T2, 5 line 7) the court apparently adjudi-
cated the entire controversy. There was no presentation 
of facts to the court, and the court apparently accepted 
the representations of Respondents in their motion for 
summary judgment as sufficient to satisfy the burden 
of proof. There is nothing else to establish the presence 
or absence of issues of facts or indicate a showing by 
Respondents, let alone meeting the burden of proof. Ap-
pellant believes that he is entitled to be heard as to all 
issues, fact or law. He is entitled to ask a court of equity 
to inquire into the execution sale and consider whether, 
in the light of all of the facts, the court should intervene 
because of inadequate consideration and whether theRe-
spondents had a right to purchase and whether or not the 
sale was attended by circumstances of unfairness. This 
Court has so held in Pender v. Dowse, 265 P.2d 644, 1 
Utah 2d 283 at page 288: 
"It is well settled that equity will intervene 
and set aside an execution sale or cancel a sher-
iff's deed, after the redemption period has ex-
pired, where it appears the consideration was 
grossly inadequate and the sale was attended by 
unfairness and fraud." 
While a motion for summary judgment has the pur-
pose of expediting litigation and therefore serves a useful 
and proper purpose, it was not intended to dispense with 
every facet of legal proceedings. Respondents' motion 
for summary judgment was not directed to the Appel-
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lant. The complaint herein prayed for relief against 
LTnion Carbide Nuclear Company, and the motion for 
summary judgment asked that the Respondents have 
judgment against that party alone and did not purport to 
determine any issues raised by Appellant's counterclaim. 
It avoids the questions raised by Appellant, and seeks 
a determination sufficient to compel the defendant Union 
Carbide Nuclear Company to pay over money it holds. 
After this is accomplished, Appellant's rights will cer-
tainly go begging, without regard to their merit. Without 
inquiry, an amended judgment was entered decreeing 
that the Appellant had no rights whatsoever in the Tom-
linson interest, (R. 49). In the first judgment, (R. 43) 
the Respondents led the court into error by urging it to 
decree that Respondents were the owners of the entire 
Tomlinson interest, contrary to the trial courts own 
judgment and the decision of this Court. The amended 
judgment (R. 48) accomplishes the same result. In their 
motions for summary judgment, (R. 33, 36) the Re-
spondents represent that they are entitled to a judgment 
'' (c) declaring plaintiffs to be entitled to receive the en-
tire 3.7158 per cent of the royalties due or becoming due 
under said lease from l\fay 1, 1958, when plaintiffs be-
came the purchasers of Third Party Defendant's interest 
in said claims at a Sheriff's Sale pursuant to a writ of 
Execution of Civil No. 7 468, a copy of the Certificate 
of Sale being attached to the Answer to Third Party 
Complaint in this action;". If anyone looked at the record 
to determine the title to the property involved, the judg-
ment in the prior case, the sheriff's deed and the amended 
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judgment would place the ownership of the entire Tom-
linson interest in the Respondents, just as they claimed. 
While the trial court intended to correct this, the amended 
judgment fails in the attempt. 
Appellant by his answer and counterclaim has 
urged that the deed was wholly void. Appellant con-
tends that he has an interest that the deed extinguishes; 
and therefore, he has a right to attack its validity. This 
presents additional issues of fact which Appellant be-
lieves genuine. The recital in the judgment that there 
is no genuine issue of any material fact is based solely 
on the affidavit of Thomas C. Cuthbert, one of theRe-
spondents' attorneys. That affidavit merely stated that 
upon information he believes that the defendant Union 
Carbide Nuclear Company was holding $738.64, of which 
Respondents were entitled to $422.08. Not only does this 
affidavit fail to dispel the notion that there are no genu-
ine issues of fact, it is insufficient as an affidavit as to 
the matters it does set forth: 
"It has been held that since affidavits must 
be made upon personal knowledge, an attorney's 
affidavit is usually insufficient, unless he has per-
sonal knowledge of the facts." 3 Federal Practice 
and Procedure, section 1237 at page 166. 
"Where attorney's affidavit, in support of 
motion or summary judgment \Yas made upon 
information and belief and relevant portion there-
of did not comply wj th Rule 56 (e), r nited States 
Supreme ·Court would disregard avern1ent in the 
motion as not supported by record. Automatic 
Radio Mfg. Co. Y. Hazeltine Research, :l\fass. 1950. 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
9 
70 S. Ct. 894, 339 U.S. 827, 94 L. Ed. 1312." 3 
Federal PractiJce and Procedure, section 1237 at 
page 166, note 4 7. 
The court realized that issues were involved which 
should be presented on a trial. The court at the hearing 
on the motion stated: 
"THE COURT: What I am concerned about 
is whether the record is such that I could grant a 
summary judgment. That is the whole story. It is 
not supported by any affidavit. 
* * * 
THE COURT: Well, I have some doubts 
about this but I'll let you take your summary 
judgment on that basis. But I may be making 
an error on that. Why don't you have the case 
come on for trial and settle all these things?" 
(T2. 4,5). 
The above statement of the court was made at the 
tin1e the first judgment was entered, but at the hearing 
on Appellant's motion to vacate, nothing more was said 
about issues of fact. It merely went to the proposition 
that the court had been led to grant more than it intend-
ed, (Tl. 3, lines 8-22). It is evident from the transcript 
that the court intended that the Respondents should only 
have judgment for a portion of the monies held by the 
defendant Union Carbide Nuclear Company. The trans-
cript clearly indicates this to be the case: 
"THE COURT: Then all you want is a judg-
ment for four hundred twenty-two dollars and 
some odd cents and any other sums that have 
become due. You want that sort of a thing on 
your summary judgment~ 
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MR. LOWE: I'd like that." (T2. 4,5). 
Upon the hearing of Appellant's motion to vacate 
judgment, it was clear that the court intended Appellant 
to have an opportunity to be heard before an amended 
judgment was signed. The court realized that the method 
of presenting the amended judgment was a short cut 
because it was not consistent with the Respondents' 
motion for summary judgment, and the court admitted 
that the matter was not properly before him, (Tl. 4, line 
22). Respondents' counsel mailed the proposed amended 
judgment to the court under date of July 3, 1959. A copy 
was not served on Appellant or any other party. The 
court apparenty waited three or four days and then 
signed the judgment thinking no objections were to be 
made by Appellant's counsel. This is indicated by the 
following statement by the court: 
"THE COURT: All right, you prepare it, file 
it, and I will entertain a motion to strike it if you 
have any question about it, and that is the way 
we will do that." (Tl. 4). 
The judgment having been signed, it appeared that a 
motion to strike would be untimely, and Appellant's only 
relief was an appeal. The notion that there are genuine 
issues to be tried by the court is evident from other partf: 
of the record. Appellate courts in determining a motion 
for summary judgment have taken the view that they are 
entitled to look at all matters in the record to determine 
the propriety of the granting or denying a motion for 
summary judgment. 
"On such a n1otion the rourt ronsiders the 
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entire setting of the case and all papers of record. 
The pleadings as a whole, and not merely the 
complaint, are considered." 3 Federal Practice 
and Procedttre, section 1236 at page 158. 
~ubsequent to this appeal, other parties have moved 
to vacate the judg1nent on the ground that the interests 
,trt' not yet deternrined. These are: Motion to Modify 
dl" Vacate Judgment by defendant Union Carbide Nuclear 
Company (R. ;)±); Motion to Modify Judgment (R. 55); 
:md :\Iotion to Vacate Garnishee Judgment (R. 56). 
Lt appears to be apparent from the record in this 
·a~e that there was no adequate basis for the granting 
()f the 1notion. .Jfany issues are still pending and have 
arisen subsequent to the appeal herein. Appellant re-
lluests that this case be reversed and remanded to the 
trial court for further proceedings. 
Respectfully submitted, 
FRED H. EVANS 
Attorney for Third-Party Defendant 
and Appellant 
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